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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ALASKA
Grady R. Campion*
ABSTRACT
In modern civil litigation, disputes rarely proceed to trial. Summary
judgment has evolved in state and federal courts across the country as a
common mechanism for dispute resolution without trial. Alaska courts have
largely refused to follow this trend. Instead, obtaining summary judgment in
Alaska represents a nearly impossible challenge. Alaska’s heightened
summary judgment standard reflects a past era—one in which advocacy
occurred in a courtroom before a jury and not in chambers on paper. This
Note analyzes the evolution of summary judgment in federal courts and in
Alaska and discusses three procedural mechanisms affecting summary
judgment in Alaska. After assessing arguments for and against modernizing
Alaska’s summary judgment standard, this Note concludes with a
recommendation: Alaska should adopt the reasonable jury summary
judgment standard.

INTRODUCTION
Despite their textual similarities, winning a motion for summary
judgment in Alaska state court is considerably more difficult than in
federal court. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided three
cases that modernized the federal summary judgment standard by
incorporating the parties’ evidentiary burdens at trial to determine
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.1 By doing so, the
Supreme Court recast summary judgment analysis to include not only
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, but also whether only the
trier of fact may resolve the issue.2 The moving party would be entitled
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unwavering support.
1. These cases have come to be known as the Celotex trilogy. They are
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
2. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
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to summary judgment as a matter of law only if the trier of fact could
come to one conclusion in light of the contested factual issues.3
The text of the federal and Alaska summary judgment rules are
nearly identical. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, courts “shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”4 Similarly, Alaska’s summary judgment rule states that
“[j]udgment shall be rendered forthwith” upon a showing “that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”5 However, the Alaska supreme court has
repeatedly declined to adopt the modern federal standard for
determining genuine issues of material fact for summary judgment
purposes.6 The Alaska summary judgment standard does not consider
evidentiary burdens and does not ask how the trier of fact would
determine any disputed issue.7 This interpretive distinction carries
important implications for the Alaska court system, its litigants, and the
efficient administration of justice.
Much like the pre-1986 federal summary judgment standard,8
Alaska courts tend to disfavor treating summary judgment motions as a
procedural shortcut. This exceedingly low barrier to entry undermines
the utility of summary judgment as an effective procedural tool for civil
practitioners and a screening device for courts. As one Alaska trial judge
jokingly explained: “Under our state’s summary judgment rule, if there
is so much as a shadow of a whisper of a hint of a contested issue of fact,
then we must deny summary judgment.”9
Parts I and II of this Note analyze the distinctions between the
federal and Alaskan summary judgment standards, respectively. Part III
discusses three procedural aspects of Alaska law that relate to the state
summary judgment standard: notice pleading, directed verdict, and
Alaska’s “English Rule” fee shifting. In Part IV, this Note weighs

3. Id. at 252.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
5. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c).
6. E.g., Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 519–20
(Alaska 2014); DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 683–84 (Alaska 2006); Moffatt v.
Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 942–44 (Alaska 1988).
7. Christensen, 335 P.3d at 519–20.
8. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (unfavorably commenting on prior federal
decisions that cast summary judgment in a disfavored light and instead
adopting the view that summary judgment is more properly viewed as “an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole”).
9. An Alaska Superior Court judge made this statement in conversation
with the author. The statement should not be interpreted as a correct statement
of the law, nor was it intended as such.
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arguments for and against changing the Alaska summary judgment
standard and concludes with the recommendation that Alaska should
adopt the federal reasonable jury standard for summary judgment.

I.

THE FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In a series of cases now known as the Celotex trilogy, the U.S.
Supreme Court significantly changed what constitutes a genuine dispute
of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. This change
modernized the summary judgment standard to mirror its procedural
relative—directed verdict—by considering the evidentiary burdens that
the movant and nonmovant will bear at trial.10
To understand the policies underlying the federal summary
judgment doctrine, it is helpful to first review the historic development
of summary judgment as a procedural tool. The origins of summary
judgment can be traced back to the 1855 Summary Procedure on Bills of
Exchange Act in England, which granted courts power to issue
summary decisions in collections actions brought by plaintiffs on bills of
exchange and promissory notes.11 The bill’s goal was “expedition and
economy in obtaining a judgment where the circumstances of the case
lent themselves to a shortened procedure.”12 In 1938, the Supreme Court
adopted Rule 56, along with the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.13 However, as
summary judgment continued to emerge as a procedural tool, federal
courts were generally reluctant to use summary judgment out of a
concern that the nonmoving party would face judgment without an
opportunity to present his case in court.14 This concern rings true in
many states today, including Alaska.15

10. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
11. Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE
L. J. 423, 424 (1929).
12. Id.
13. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 415, 651 Stat. 1064 (1934). See also
Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (1989) (discussing
the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
14. Clark & Samenow, supra note 11, at 470.
15. In 1975, the Second Circuit characterized summary judgment as “a
drastic device since its prophylactic function, when exercised, cuts off a party’s
right to present his case to the jury.” Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co.,
524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975). While the Celotex trilogy of cases incorporated
a new summary judgment standard in federal courts, at least eleven states,
including Alaska, have remained reluctant to loosen summary judgment.
Thomas Logue & Javier A. Soto, Florida Should Adopt the Celotex Standard for
Summary Judgment, 76 FLA. B.J. 20, 20 (2002).
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As a result, pre-1986 summary judgment rulings required that the
movant present evidence negating the nonmovant’s case in order to
obtain summary judgment.16 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,17 the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant because the moving defendant had failed to
“foreclose the possibility” that the jury could infer facts sufficient for the
nonmovant to prove its case.18 Under Adickes, the movant’s Rule 56
burden required disproving the nonmovant’s case by producing
affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of any material factual issue.19
In a case where the movant bears no burden of proof at trial, as in
Adickes, the pre-1986 summary judgment standard imposed an
artificially high barrier on the movant.20
Sixteen years later in 1986, the Supreme Court recast the standard
set forth in Adickes. In Celotex Corp v. Catrett,21 the Supreme Court
addressed the standard for summary judgment in the context of an
asbestos case.22 Plaintiff’s claim, that the defendant’s products contained
asbestos and exposure to that asbestos caused the death of her husband,
would have been virtually immune to defendant’s summary judgment
under Adickes analysis.23 The defendant-movant would have been
required to foreclose the possibility of a verdict for the plaintiff at trial—
that is, the defendant would have needed to prove the decedent’s
nonexposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing products at any point in
the decedent’s life.24
Without expressly overruling Adickes, the Supreme Court held that
Rule 56(c) requires the entry of summary judgment against a nonmovant
“who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of any
element essential to [the nonmovant’s] case, and on which [the
nonmovant] will bear the burden of proof at trial.”25 In this
circumstance, a “complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element” of the nonmovant’s case necessarily means that no genuine

16. John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v.
Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problem under Rule 56, 6 REV.
LITIG. 227, 236 (1987).
17. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
18. Id. at 157.
19. Kennedy, supra note 16, at 229.
20. Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications
of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2005).
21. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
22. Id. at 319.
23. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 80 (1990).
24. Id.
25. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
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issue of material fact exists, rendering any other disputed facts
immaterial.26 Thus, the standard for granting summary judgment
“mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a).”27
The Court’s decision in Celotex, however, raised more questions
about the federal summary judgment standard than it answered. For
one, a five-vote majority issued the Celotex opinion, with then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist writing for four Justices and Justice White
concurring.28 These opinions included three divergent views on the
burden of production required of the nonmovant to sufficiently
demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.29 Justice Rehnquist
characterized this burden as “informing” the court of the absence of
disputed facts.30 Justice White required more in his concurrence,
reasoning that “a conclusory assertion that the [nonmovant] has no
evidence to prove his case” is not enough to move for summary
judgment.31 Justice Brennan concluded in dissent that the movant
without the burden of proof at trial could satisfy his burden of
production for summary judgment either by presenting evidence
negating an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim, or by
affirmatively showing that there is no evidence in the record to support
a judgment for the nonmovant.32 By shifting the requirements of
summary judgment to correspond with the party’s trial burdens and
requiring nonmovants to produce evidence of the full range of disputed
facts, the Celotex majority made summary judgment a defendant’s
motion.
Celotex also did not answer the question of how judges determine
sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence presented at summary
judgment in light of the reordered burdens facing the movant and
nonmovant at summary judgment.33 Considered in light of Celotex, both
26. Id. at 323.
27. Id.
28. Justice Rehnquist’s lead opinion was written on behalf of himself and
Justices Marshall, Powell, and O’Connor. 477 U.S. at 319. Justice White’s
concurring opinion provided the fifth vote for the majority. Id. at 328. Justice
Brennan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. at
329. Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds. Id. at 337.
29. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 81.
30. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
31. Id. at 328.
32. Id. at 331–32.
33. See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
81, 104–07 (2006) (discussing questions left unanswered by majority opinion in
Celotex relating to the movant’s burden, the nonmovant’s burden, admissibility,
and determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented by a nonmovant to
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.34 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp.35 enlarged the trial judge’s discretionary authority
by allowing for evidentiary review at the summary judgment stage.
In Anderson, the Supreme Court considered the newly announced
summary judgment standard from Celotex in a defamation claim. Liberty
Lobby brought a libel action against journalist Jack Anderson and others
for three articles published in The Investigator magazine, which
portrayed Liberty Lobby as “neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and
Fascist.”36 Anderson moved for summary judgment arguing that Liberty
Lobby failed to present sufficient evidence of Anderson’s actual malice.37
The Court had to determine whether a showing of actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence, as the Court announced in the landmark
decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,38 applied at the summary
judgment stage in Liberty Lobby’s case.39
The Court held that the “inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates
the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the
trial on the merits.”40 Applying the substantive evidentiary burdens at
trial meant that the judge must decide “whether a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”41 The
Court reasoned that it made “no sense to say that a jury could
reasonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what
standards govern its deliberations.”42 Those standards are provided by
the substantive evidentiary burdens applicable to the claim and
properly determined by the trial judge at summary judgment.43
However, the Court insisted that determining credibility, weighing the
evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the evidence are
functions of the jury alone.44 The judge must view the evidence in the

prevent summary judgment).
34. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
35. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
36. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245.
37. Id.
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48.
40. Id. at 252.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 254–55.
43. Id. at 255.
44. Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan notes the inherent tension in this
concession. The measurement of the “caliber and quantity” of the evidence can
only be performed by weighing the evidence, which is solely the province of the
jury. Justice Brennan laments that the Anderson majority may invite “trial courts
to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would.” Id. at 266 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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light most favorable to the nonmovant.45 Additionally, Anderson
provides the escape hatch that trial judges may decide not to grant
summary judgment when there is reason to believe that a better course
of action would be to proceed to trial.46
Anderson extends the Court’s directive in Celotex, mandating courts
to consider the sufficiency of the evidentiary record, to its logical
consequence: the sufficiency of the evidentiary record is a function of the
burdens of the parties at trial.47 While the Court carefully instructs that
trial courts must not weigh the evidence, trial courts must assess
whether the nonmovant provided enough evidence to support its claim
at trial.48 Thus, Anderson confirms the similarity between directed
verdict and modern summary judgment and recognizes that the
“substantive law, presumptions, and burdens of production and
persuasion” bear on both directed verdict and summary judgment
motions.49
The Court’s holding in Matsushita reveals the extent of the
deference afforded to trial courts at the summary judgment phase
following Celotex and Anderson. In Matsushita, American television
manufacturers, led by Zenith, brought an antitrust suit against
Matsushita and other Japanese television manufacturers, alleging that
the Japanese manufacturers had illegally conspired in a predatory
pricing scheme to set artificially low prices in the United States to drive
American manufacturers out of the market.50 Matsushita moved for
summary judgment arguing that Zenith had failed to produce
admissible evidence the Japanese manufacturers entered into an illegal
conspiracy.51 The Court held that if the facts render the nonmovant’s
claim implausible—”if the claim is one that simply makes no economic
sense”—then the nonmovant must present more persuasive evidence in
support of its claim.52
In sum, the Celotex trilogy reformulated the federal summary
judgment standard in two significant ways, both of which greatly
increased the utility of summary judgment as procedural device. First,
the trilogy shifted the summary judgment burden to parallel that of the
party bearing the burden of proof at trial.53 In other words, the movant

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kennedy, supra note 16, at 232.
475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 587.
William W. Schwarzer, et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
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does not need to disprove the nonmovant’s case to prevail at summary
judgment.54 In practice, this most often means that the nonmovant
plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof at trial, must also fend off a
defendant’s summary judgment motion. Second, the Court reformulated
summary judgment by granting federal trial judges considerable
discretion to consider genuine issues and factual support in the record.55
These two major changes to federal summary judgment strengthened
the motion as a tool for movants and increased the efficiency of the
motion as a screening device for courts.

II. ALASKA’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The text of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 5656 sets forth a
summary judgment rule substantially similar to the text of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56.57 However, an important textual difference in the
Alaska rule is that a motion “may be supported by affidavits” stating the
material facts based on personal knowledge.58 Accordingly, an
opposition to summary judgment may include opposing affidavits and
“a concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as
to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be
litigated.”59 Aside from allowing parties to show facts by affidavit in
Alaska,60 the federal and state requirements for summary judgment are
the same textually: “that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact” and the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”61
In 1962, Gilbertson v. City of Fairbanks62 provided the Alaska
supreme court its first opportunity to decide a summary judgment
motion under the state’s recently enacted Rules of Civil Procedure.63 By
affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the court in
Gilbertson ushered in a long line of cases adhering to the pre-1986 federal

Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 451 (1992).
54. Id.
55. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 79.
56. “Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c).
57. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
58. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. FED R. CIV. P. 56(a).
62. 368 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1962).
63. Id. at 214.
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summary judgment standard.64 Gilbertson involved a dispute over
outstanding utility bills Gilbertson owed to the city-owned utility
following a fire that destroyed Gilbertson’s hotel.65 The City moved for
summary judgment based on affidavits and cancelled checks showing
the unpaid balance for utility services provided to the hotel.66 Opposing
the City’s motion, Gilbertson relied on his deposition testimony in
which he stated: “I am sure my bills were paid as my cancelled checks
show . . . so far as I know. I could have lost some checks in the fire.”67
Gilbertson argued that this testimony raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the bills were paid.68
The court rejected Gilbertson’s argument that the possibility he
“could have lost some checks in the fire” standing alone was sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.69 In affirming the trial court’s
grant of the City’s summary judgment motion, the supreme court
reasoned that even if Gilbertson had made an unequivocal assertion that
his account was paid in full, then summary judgment would have been
improper.70 However, Gilbertson failed to demonstrate a genuine issue
of material fact because his only supporting evidence was an equivocal
statement.71 This shows that the Alaska court employed the same preCelotex trilogy summary judgment standard. For example, if Gilbertson
had testified in his deposition that his record of checks showed some
payments had not been credited or if the record of checks itself had been
lost in the fire, then such testimony would have created a genuine issue
of fact for trial.72 Arguably, these hypothetical examples would not pass
muster under the Celotex trilogy because even an unequivocal statement
from Gilbertson, considered in contrast to the City’s physical evidence of
previously paid checks in the months leading up to the fire, would fail
to persuade any reasonable jury about the merits of Gilbertson’s
defense.

64. Id. at 216–17. See, e.g., Palzer v. Serv-U-Meat Co., 419 P.2d 201, 205
(Alaska 1966) (following the pre-1986 federal approach to summary judgment);
Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 939–44 (Alaska 1988) (rejecting the modern
federal summary judgment standard announced in the Celotex trilogy);
Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 519–20 (Alaska 2014)
(reaffirming Alaska’s commitment to the pre-1986 federal summary judgment
standard).
65. Gilbertson, 368 P.2d at 216–17.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 216.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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In 1988, two years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Celotex
trilogy, the Alaska supreme court considered whether to incorporate
substantive evidentiary burdens into Alaska state summary judgment
practice. Moffatt v. Brown73 involved a defamation claim by a physician
against a newsletter publisher for allegedly false statements the
publisher circulated in a newsletter regarding the physician’s abortion
practice.74 In Moffatt, the Alaska supreme court declined to adopt the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Anderson and instead reaffirmed its
prior line of cases interpreting Rule 56(c) to require only “a showing that
a genuine issue of material fact exists to be litigated, and not a showing
that a party will ultimately prevail at trial.”75 The Moffat court reasoned
that incorporating substantive evidentiary burdens at summary
judgment impermissibly required weighing the evidence, encroaching
upon the role of the jury.76 As a consequence of this holding, the Alaska
supreme court rendered summary judgment “somewhat harder for a
libel defendant to win” in Alaska state courts as compared to federal
court.77
Most recently, the Alaska supreme court reaffirmed its
commitment to the pre-1986 federal summary judgment standard in
Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.78 There, the plaintiffs brought a
design-defect product liability suit against a car dealership alleging that
the car’s seat belt system failed to restrain the driver in a collision with
two moose.79 Following discovery, Alaska Sales & Service moved for
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient
evidence that the seat belt was defective and also that plaintiffs failed to
set forth admissible evidence that the seat beat’s failure caused
plaintiff’s injuries.80 The trial court granted Alaska Sales & Service’s
summary judgment motion and denied plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, determining that “no reasonable jury could find that
[plaintiffs] have proven that the seat belt . . . was defective.”81
In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the
Alaska supreme court first noted that the trial court’s conclusion
misstated Alaska’s summary judgment standard in two ways.82 First, to
73. 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988).
74. Id. at 940.
75. Id. at 943–44 (citing Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 395 (Alaska 1970)).
76. Id. at 944 (citing Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d
220, 236 (N.J. 1986).
77. Id.
78. 335 P.3d 514, 521 (Alaska 2014).
79. Id. at 515.
80. Id. at 516.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
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fend off summary judgment, the state summary judgment standard
does not require that the non-movant prove anything.83 Instead, it is
enough for the non-movant to present some evidence “directly
contradict[ing] the moving party’s evidence.”84 Second, to the extent that
the trial court’s use of the term “reasonable jury” indicated that Alaska
courts consider the evidence in light of a potential jury outcome—i.e.
incorporating the substantive evidentiary burden at trial, as n federal
court—the lower court erred.85 The supreme court explained the proper
summary judgment analysis under the Alaska standard as follows:
Although we occasionally have described the reasonableness
standard as whether ‘reasonable jurors could disagree on the
resolution of a factual issue,’ our perhaps inartful use of the
term ‘reasonable jurors’ was not meant to suggest use of the
federal summary judgment standard. We require only that the
evidence proposed for trial must not be based entirely on
‘unsupported assumptions and speculation’ and must not be
‘too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.’ After the
court makes reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor
of the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate
only when no reasonable person could discern a genuine
factual dispute on a material issue.86
Thus, the court framed the inquiry as “whether a reasonable person
could believe the non-moving party’s assertions” and concluded that the
non-movant’s assertions created a genuine issue of material fact.87
The distinction between a reasonable jury and reasonable minds
slices the bologna very thin, but this difference cuts to the middle of
Alaska’s outdated method of summary judgment analysis. If the federal
summary judgment standard is appropriately summarized as the
“reasonable jury” standard, then the Alaska standard may be
characterized as the “not too incredible to be believed” standard.
Applying the Alaska summary judgment standard to the facts of
Christensen, the court found genuine issues of material fact as to both
defective design and causation.88 In support of the defective design
dispute, plaintiffs proffered evidence of an unbroken chain of custody
and deposition testimony that the seat belt mechanism occasionally
failed to lock upon sudden forward movement and that the plaintiff

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 520.
Id. at 515.

ARTICLE 5 - CAMPION (DO NOT DELETE)

192

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/18/2015 2:11 PM

Vol. 32:1

always wore a seat belt.89 The movant-defendant argued that the lack of
evidence regarding the actual seat belt, its performance in the crash, or
any police report presented such a gap in the evidentiary record that no
genuine issue existed.90 To prevent summary judgment on causation, the
nonmovant-plaintiffs presented evidence of a lack of memory following
the accident, medical evidence of a “closed head injury,” and a mark on
Christensen’s head after the accident.91 The supreme court concluded
that plaintiff’s evidence was “not too incredible to be believed” and
therefore supported the inference that the alleged seat belt defect caused
plaintiff’s injuries, a genuine issue of material fact.92
Assessing the facts of Christensen, the supreme court may have
arrived at the right conclusion by allowing plaintiffs to proceed to trial,
but it did so for the wrong reasons and under an imprecise method of
analysis. Finding a genuine dispute as to defective design, the court
relied heavily on plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the seat belt lock
failed on occasion, both before and after the accident. Without this
testimony, plaintiff’s remaining evidence—an unbroken chain of
custody and habitual seat belt use—was silent as to any defectively
designed seat belt lock, instead relying only on “unsupported
assumptions and speculation.”93 However, even under the “reasonable
jury” standard employed in federal courts, plaintiff’s testimony that the
seat belt lock occasionally failed may have been enough to survive
summary judgment because credibility determinations are an issue left
to the trier of fact.94 In cases like Christensen, where summary judgment
turns on the nonmovant’s testimony, the application of the federal and
Alaskan summary judgment standards will likely lead to the same
result.
Alaska’s “not too incredible to be believed”95 summary judgment
standard also leaves questions regarding weighing and sufficiency of
89. Id. at 521.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 522.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 520 (requiring the nonmovant to present more than
“unsupported assumptions and speculation” to overcome the movant’s
summary judgment motion).
94. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (limiting the
Supreme Court’s holding by noting that credibility determinations are left to the
jury).
95. The Alaskan court first employed this language in Wilson v. Pollet: “If, at
the hearing on a motion for summary judgment, there is contradictory evidence,
or the movant’s evidence is impeached on material matters, then an issue of
credibility is raised, providing the contradictory or impeaching evidence is not
too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.” 416 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska
1966).
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the evidence unanswered. While the federal summary judgment
standard may be open to objections of judges weighing the evidence,96
the Alaska standard arguably does the same. The only way for an
Alaska judge to determine whether the nonmovant’s evidence is not too
incredible to be believed is to weigh the nonmovant’s evidence against
the evidence proffered by the movant. Case law does not make clear
precisely how much evidence is sufficient make the dispute genuine, but
the nonmovant must at least present “more than a scintilla of contrary
evidence.”97
Other cases expose the over-breadth of the Alaskan “not too
incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard. For example, in
1999, the supreme court reversed a trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in an improbable—but somehow not incredible98—set of facts.
In Meyer v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement
Division ex rel. N.G.T.,99 the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED)
sought to establish Meyer’s paternity of N.G.T., the child in question.100
Following discovery, CSED moved for summary judgment against
Meyer, relying on a genetic test that established “the probability of
Meyer’s parentage at 99.98%.”101 Meyer’s opposition to CSED’s
summary judgment motion relied on a sworn affidavit in which he
admitted to sexual intercourse with the mother, but denied intercourse
during the possible period of conception.102 However, Meyer admitted
that his memory was hazy and could only offer his “belief” that sexual
intercourse was prior to the probable dates of conception.103
The supreme court held that Meyer’s sworn denial of sexual

96. Anderson, 477 U.S at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally Kennedy,
supra note 16.
97. E.g., Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 125 P.3d 335, 339 (Alaska 2005)
(quoting Martech Const. Co. v. Ogden Envtl. Servs., Inc., 852 P.2d 1146, 1149 n.7
(Alaska 1993)).
98. Meyer was decided fifteen years before Christensen and does not employ
the court’s “not too incredible to be believed” language. However, Christensen
reaffirms Alaska’s summary judgment standard without modification. 335 P.3d
at 516–17. Thus, Meyer is properly analyzed under the same “not too incredible
to be believed” language.
99. 994 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1999).
100. Id. at 366.
101. Id. According to the genetic test, the odds favoring Meyer’s paternity
were 6,243 to 1. Id.
102. Id. “Meyer admitted having a sexual relationship with the mother and
could not remember the precise details of this relationship.” Id. at 371. The
possible period of conception was between March 15, 1992 and April 15, 1992,
but the court does not discuss the method by which the possible period of
conception was determined. See id. at 366. The baby, N.G.T., was born on
December 26, 1992. Id.
103. Id. at 369 (Fabe, J., dissenting).
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intercourse during the possible period of conception sufficiently created
a genuine issue of material fact and therefore precluded summary
judgment.104 While noting that Meyer must submit more than a scintilla
of contrary evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the court
opaquely explained that Meyer’s sworn denial was more than a scintilla
of evidence.105 At least implicitly, the supreme court recognized the
improbable, even incredible, nature of its holding.106 For instance, the
court recognized the possibility that Meyer was not the father, but failed
to consider or analyze the possibility that the thirty-day period of
conception may have been too narrow.107 Additionally, although the
court professed not to “weigh the evidence . . . on summary
judgment[,]”108 it did weigh evidence in determining that Meyer’s
affidavit was not simply unsupported speculation or too incredible to be
believed, and that it constituted more than a scintilla of evidence.
The court’s conclusion in Meyer raises issues about what
“reasonable minds”109 actually means. The term “reasonable minds” is
just as much a legal fiction as “reasonable jury.” The reasonable minds
classification accomplishes little in deciding summary judgment. Rather,
it is a categorical box that judges use to conduct legal analysis based on
facts, as they fairly understand them.110 Of course, “reasonable minds” is
a much larger categorical box than “reasonable jury” because it does not
include the applicable substantive legal standard. Alaska should adopt
the smaller box in summary judgment analysis. Meyer raises questions
about the meaning of “reasonable minds” under Alaska’s “not too
incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard111 when
conflicting evidence flies in the face of common sense.
The court’s decision in Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.112 presents a different
problem: whether summary judgment may be denied under the “not too
incredible to be believed” standard when common sense supports denial
of the motion, but the evidence does not. The facts of Kalenka are tragic.
After spending several hours drinking at Chilkoot Charlie’s, an
Anchorage bar, Morrell left the bar and drove to a fast-food drive

104. Id. at 368.
105. Id.
106. See id. (“We remain cognizant of the significant statistical odds
suggesting Meyer’s paternity.”).
107. See id. at 366.
108. Id. at 367.
109. Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 (Alaska 2014).
110. See, e.g., Meyer, 994 P.2d at 368 (stating that the court resolves factual
disputes at summary judgment in favor of the nonmovant).
111. Christensen, 335 P.3d at 521.
112. 305 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2013).
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through where Morrell bumped the rear of Kalenka’s car.113 The two
men got into an altercation and Morrell fatally stabbed Kalenka.114
In filing suit against Chilkoot Charlie to recover a civil judgment,
the Kalenka Estate must present evidence that the bar served Morrell
alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated.115 Alaska law immunizes dram
shops from civil liability for damages caused by an intoxicated patron
unless the dram shop provided alcohol to the patron when the
individual was already a “drunken person.”116 The statutory definition
of drunken person has two elements: (1) substantial impairment of the
person’s physical or mental conduct resulting from the consumption of
alcohol; and (2) that such impairment be plain and easily observed or
discovered by outward manifestations.117
The Kalenka Estate presented no direct evidence of Morrell’s
appearance or conduct at the bar.118 The Kalenka Estate presented an
expert report in opposition to Chilkoot Charlie’s motion for summary
judgment which concluded that employees at Chilkoot should have
monitored Morrell’s drunkenness, but did not state whether any
employee actually observed Morrell exhibit manifestations of
drunkenness, as required by the statute.119 The trial court granted the
bar’s summary judgment motion because the Kalenka Estate’s evidence
involved “‘such a degree of speculation’ that no jury could properly
infer Morrell was observably drunk at the bar.”120 By a three to two
margin, the supreme court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment after finding six pieces of evidence that the Kalenka Estate
presented, coupled with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the
nonmovant, which raised a genuine issue of material fact preventing
summary judgment for the bar.121 These six facts were: (1) Morrell was
at Chilkoot Charlie’s for two to four hours; (2) he consumed no alcohol
before arriving at the bar; (3) Morrell was served and consumed 18-19
113. Id. at 347.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 350.
116. Id. at 349.
117. ALASKA STAT. 04.21.080(b)(8); Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 349–50.
118. Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 349. Surprisingly, Morrell was available to testify
and the trial court granted a continuance to give the Kalenka Estate an
opportunity to depose Morrell, but the Kalenka Estate decided not to depose
Morrell. Id. at 354 n.15 (Maassen, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 348.
120. Id. at 349. Interestingly, the language describing what “no jury could
properly infer” is that of the supreme court. Alaska’s summary judgment
standard does not ask what a jury could properly infer, but rather, what
evidence is not “too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.” Christensen
v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520.
121. Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 351.
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alcoholic drinks while at the bar; (4) he consumed no alcohol after
leaving the bar; (5) approximately forty-five minutes after leaving the
bar, Morrell displayed “visible and obvious signs of intoxication;” and
(6) Morrell’s blood-alcohol level was estimated as high as 0.27.122
However, as the Kalenka dissent points out, these six facts only
support that Morrell was highly intoxicated at the bar and that he
manifested his drunkenness forty-five minutes later during a fight.123
Thus, the assertions that Morrell outwardly manifested his drunkenness
at the bar and the bar’s employees failed to observe these manifestations
were not inferences but merely speculation.124 The dissent argued that
the Kalenka Estate’s claim rested entirely upon “unsupported
assumptions and speculation.”125
In contrast to Meyer, Kalenka is a case in which common sense and
experience support the sentiment that the Kalenka Estate should be
allowed to proceed to trial, while the evidence presented does not.
Arguably, anybody who has seen a highly intoxicated person at a bar
has a vivid mental image of how Morrell appeared the night at Chilkoot
Charlie’s as he ordered his tenth, fifteenth, and eighteenth drink.126
However, there was no evidence presented to establish Morrell’s
behavior inside the bar. As the dissent notes, the “threshold for
defeating summary judgment is indeed low, . . . but it is still a threshold
that can be crossed only with evidence.”127
The majority’s decision to allow the Kalenka Estate to proceed to
trial creates two possible outcomes. Either Kalenka Estate’s claim would
lose at directed verdict or the case would proceed to trial, where a jury
would almost inevitably find for defendant after being instructed on the
statutorily defined requirements for establishing dram shop liability.
The Kalenka majority set a low bar for surviving a motion for summary
judgment, one that allows plaintiffs to proceed to trial, but does not
encourage plaintiffs to gather the necessary evidence first. Here, perhaps
a more demanding summary judgment standard would have
encouraged the Kalenka Estate to depose Morrell and gather the
evidence needed to win at trial.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 353 (Maassen, J., dissenting).
124. Id. This point is reinforced by the only eyewitness testimony of Morrell’s
typical appearance at the bar; on previous occasions Morrell had been “polite,
soft spoken and mellow.” Id. at 349.
125. Id. at 352 (Maassen, J., dissenting; see Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520
(requiring the nonmovant demonstrate more than “unsupported assumptions
and speculation” to survive summary judgment).
126. Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 348.
127. Id. at 352 (Maassen, J., dissenting).
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III. THREE PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS AFFECTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN ALASKA
In addition to the problems inherent in Alaska’s “not too incredible
to be believed” summary judgment standard, three unique aspects of
civil procedure in Alaska further urge courts to adopt a more
demanding standard. First, Alaska has not addressed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s heightened pleading standards set forth in Twombly128 and
Iqbal,129 and remains a notice pleading state.130 Second, Alaska’s directed
verdict standard is not entirely clear.131 The court’s most recent
statement of the directed verdict standard grants trial courts more
discretion after trial than at the pre-trial summary judgment stage.132
Third, unlike federal courts, Alaska employs the “English Rule” for fee
shifting following the entry of judgment.133 Taken together, notice
pleading, the vagueness Alaska’s directed verdict, and Alaska’s fee
shifting rules would support changing the state’s summary judgment
bar to mirror the modern federal “reasonable jury standard.”
A.

Notice Pleading

Both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 require a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
the pleader is entitled to relief.”134 Notice pleading, as the U.S. Supreme
Court described it in Conley v. Gibson,135 only requires plaintiff to give
“fair notice” of the claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests to

128. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
129. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
130. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8. See also Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 674 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from the majority’s grant of a motion to dismiss on grounds that
Alaska’s notice pleading standard requires the complaint only set forth some
viable cause of action).
131. See Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49
(Alaska 2014) (disavowing prior comparisons of directed verdict to summary
judgment and stating that Alaska’s “summary judgment standard is not the
same as the standard for deciding post-trial motions for directed verdict”).
Compare Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017–18 (Alaska 2011) (using a
summary judgment standard for a directed verdict) with Murray E. Gildersleeve
Logging Co. v. N. Timber Corp., 670 P.2d 372, 377 (Alaska 1983) (using a
different definition of the standard for a direct verdict).
132. Christensen, 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49.
133. State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398 (Alaska 2007).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(a).
135. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554
(2007).
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survive dismissal of the complaint.136 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
arguably raised its pleading standard interpretation in Twombly137 and
Iqbal138 to require the showing of a plausible claim for relief. Alaska has
neither addressed nor adopted this change.139
The Alaska supreme court has not addressed whether the facial
plausibility standard federal courts in Twombly and Iqbal adopted also
applies in Alaska.140 However, there is little reason to think that Alaska
will adopt the facial plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) analysis any
time soon. Alaska courts disfavor motions to dismiss and grant
dismissal only when it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.”141 Even if
the relief demanded in the complaint is unobtainable, Alaska courts
refuse to dismiss the complaint “as long as some relief might be
available on the basis of the alleged facts.”142 Thus, Alaska courts
construe complaints liberally and grant the complaining party the
benefit of the doubt.143
By contrast, federal courts require facial plausibility of a complaint
to survive a motion to dismiss analysis.144 This plausibility standard
requires that the plaintiff’s complaint show more than a possibility of

136. Id. at 47.
137. 550 U.S. 554. In the antitrust context, Twombly required that the plaintiff
must allege facts in the complaint with sufficient specificity to allow a court to
determine that the claim was plausible. Id. at 556.
138. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). This case applied Twombly’s heightened pleading
standard to all federal civil litigation. Id. at 684. After Iqbal, a federal complaint
must state a plausible claim for relief, assuming all well-plead factual allegations
as true, to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678–79.
139. E.g., L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson, 290 P.3d 215, 218 (Alaska 2012) (using the
“no set of facts” language from Conley); Philip A. Tarpley, The Doctrine In The
Shadows: Reverse-Erie, Its Cases, Its Theories, And Its Future With Plausibility
Pleading In Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 215 (2015) (“Though a replica state, the
Alaska court system has yet to address Twombly and Iqbal.”).
140. Twombly has been cited by the United States District Court for the
District of Alaska twenty-seven times, but it has never been cited by the Alaska
supreme court. Similarly, Iqbal has been cited by the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska twenty-six times, but it has never been cited by the
Alaska supreme court.
141. Adkins v. Stansel, 204 P.3d 1031, 1033 (Alaska 2009). This echoes the preTwombly-Iqbal federal standard: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45–46 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 554.
142. Adkins, 204 P.3d at 1033.
143. See Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 791 (Alaska 1986)
(“The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is
rarely granted.”) (internal citation omitted).
144. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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entitlement to relief, but less than a level of probability.145 Complaints
that fail to allege sufficient factual particularity to carry claims “across
the line from conceivable to plausible” are dismissed under the facial
plausibility standard.146 Deciding a motion to dismiss under the
standard of facial plausibility is a context-specific inquiry that requires
federal courts to rely on judicial experience and common sense.147 Thus,
a complaint requires far more factual specificity to survive a motion to
dismiss in federal court than in Alaska state court.
Considered together, motion to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment in federal court shifts the gatekeeping function of the trial
judge from the trial phase forward to both the pleading and discovery
phases.148 The modernization of the pleading standard and summary
judgment standard in federal court affords trial judges significant
pretrial discretion.149 The experience and common sense of the federal
judiciary justifies this discretion.150 A heightened summary judgment
standard differs from a heightened pleading standard in that the facts
matter, and this Note advocates for a higher summary judgment
standard but not a heightened pleading standard. At the summary
judgment stage of a proceeding, the trial judge has the benefit of a full
evidentiary record.151 While a heightened pleading standard dismisses a
plaintiff before unlocking the door to discovery, a heightened summary
judgment standard only dismisses a plaintiff when no stone has been
left unturned.
B.

Directed Verdict

Recently, the supreme court has stated that Alaska’s summary
judgment standard does not mirror the state’s standard for deciding
post-trial motions for directed verdict.152 In a footnote, the supreme
court in Christensen favorably quoted a thirty-one year old recitation of
145. Id.
146. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
147. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
148. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 50–51 (2010).
149. Id. at 51.
150. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that determining plausibility will “be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense”).
151. If sufficient evidence is not available to the nonmovant, “the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f).
152. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 50(a); Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335
P.3d 514, 520 n.49 (Alaska 2014).
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Alaska’s directed verdict standard: “[A] directed verdict will be granted
when reasonable jurors could not differ in their resolution of a disputed
issue of fact.”153 Thus, unlike Alaska’s summary judgment standard,
directed verdict analysis incorporates the movant’s evidentiary burden
in determining whether a factual issue is genuinely disputed.154
However, the supreme court has repeatedly muddled whether
directed verdict motions are analyzed under the “reasonable jury”
standard (incorporating the evidentiary burden)155 or the “reasonable
person” standard (not incorporating the evidentiary burden).156
Confusingly, the supreme court has cited the same case at different times
for these conflicting propositions.157
By contrast, the federal standard for directed verdict under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) is set forth in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.158 In federal court, the standard for directed verdict mirrors the
standard for summary judgment.159 A trial judge must direct a verdict
“if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion
as to the verdict.”160 At the federal level, the difference between
summary judgment and directed verdict is procedural: summary
judgment is decided on documentary evidence before trial while
directed verdict is made at trial based on the admitted evidence,
whether documentary, physical, or oral testimony.161
If we take the Alaska supreme court at its (most recent) word,
Alaska’s directed verdict standard is essentially the same as the federal
153. Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520, n.49 (quoting Murray E. Gildersleeve
Logging Co. v. N. Timber Corp., 670 P.2d 372, 377 (Alaska 1983)).
154. Id.
155. E.g., id.
156. E.g., Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., J.V., 778 P.2d 569, 578
(Alaska 1989) (stating that the court’s role “is to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that
reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment as to the facts”; see also
Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017–18 (Alaska 2011) (stating that for
directed verdict purposes “the only evidence that should be considered is the
evidence favorable to the non-moving party” and if there exists “any doubt,
questions of fact should be submitted to the jury”) (emphasis added).
157. Compare Gildersleeve, 670 P.2d at 377 (citing Mullen v. Christiansen, 642
P.2d 1345, 1348 (Alaska 1982) for the proposition that directed verdict will be
granted when “reasonable jurors could not differ in their resolution of a
disputed issue of fact.”), with Great W. Sav. Bank, 778 P.2d at 578 (citing Mullen,
642 P.2d 1345 (pin cite omitted in original) for the proposition that directed
verdict will be granted when “reasonable persons could not differ in their
judgment as to the facts” and further explaining that courts will not weigh
evidence or determine credibility at directed verdict).
158. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
159. Id. at 250.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 251.
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standard. The court considers the evidence in light of the parties’
evidentiary burdens and may enter a verdict for the movant if no
genuine issue of fact exists to require jury submission.162 This makes
perfectly good sense. A directed verdict motion follows the presentation
of evidence at trial and cross-examination. The only cases affected by
direct verdict are those that are not worthy of submission to the jury to
begin with.163 If Alaska trial judges have the discretion to determine
directed verdict motions under a “reasonable jury” standard, they
should be afforded the same discretion to apply the same standard at
the pretrial stage by way of summary judgment. Further, a revised
summary judgment standard would afford the Alaska supreme court
another opportunity to clarify its unclear case law on the appropriate
standard for directed verdict.
C.

“English Rule” Fee Shifting

Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 grants the prevailing party in a
civil lawsuit partial compensation by allowing a percentage award of a
recovered money judgment, or a percentage of attorney’s fees in a nonmonetary judgment, paid by the losing party.164 Rule 82 sets out a
schedule providing the recoverable percentage for attorney’s fees based
on the judgment amount and whether the case went to trial.165 In the
other forty-nine states, courts employ the “American Rule” in which the
prevailing party is typically not entitled to attorney’s fees from the
losing party.166 Alaska’s “English Rule” aims to compensate a prevailing
party for the expenses incurred asserting and enforcing its rights.167
Proponents of Alaska’s fee shifting rule argue that heightened stakes
both restrain frivolous or weak claims and create higher incentives for
meritorious parties to assert their rights by compensating the prevailing
party.168 Opponents of the “English Rule” argue that the rule creates
unfair windfall, draconian penalties for losing litigants, and generally
has a chilling effect on both meritorious and frivolous litigation.169
Though Alaska’s “English Rule” has been analyzed both

162. Id.; Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49
(Alaska 2014).
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
164. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
165. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
166. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
167. State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398 (Alaska 2007).
168. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s
Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 35 (1996).
169. Id.
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theoretically and empirically, the tangible effects of the rule remain
murky.170 However, three points are important in the context of Alaska’s
summary judgment standard. First, Alaska’s “English Rule” does not
appear to affect the per capita rate of civil lawsuit filings.171 While there
are countless jurisdictional, cultural, and economic factors that require
approaching this conclusion with caution, if correct, this finding
indicates that the “English Rule” has little effect on frivolous lawsuits.
Second, Rule 82 is predominantly a one-way street in practice.172
Victorious plaintiffs bringing suits against corporations and insurance
companies generally have a much higher prospect at recovering Rule 82
fees than victorious defendant corporations.173
Third, and perhaps most important for any summary judgment
discussion, the effect of Rule 82 on settlement prospects is unclear.174
Rule 82 has the potential to increase the total cost of litigation for the
losing party, thereby increasing the stakes of proceeding to trial.
Rule 82 should, then, encourage settlements among risk-averse,
rational parties. However, such assumptions may not bear out in
personally and emotionally charged cases. The actual effect of Rule 82
may instead be heavily influenced by the nature of the claim and the
relationship between the parties to the lawsuit. A higher standard for
summary judgment would serve to further settlement incentives by
establishing a clear and meaningful litmus test for the viability of claims
in Alaska during the pre-trial phase of litigation.

IV. WEIGHING THE MERITS OF CHANGING ALASKA’S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STANDARD
Thus far, this Note has analyzed the distinctions between current
federal and Alaska summary judgment standards and discussed three
related procedural devices that may support a modernized Alaska
170. See Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the
Impact of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 7
(2012) (reviewing theoretical arguments about the “English Rule,” conducting a
comparative empirical analysis of civil filings in Alaska and similar districts, and
concluding that civil filings are not significantly deterred in Alaska by the Rule);
Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 168, at 62 (discussing the study’s empirical
findings regarding the effects of Alaska’s “English Rule”); Gordon Sommers, The
End of the Public Interest Exception: Preventing the Deterrence of Future Litigants with
Rule 82(b)(3)(I), 31 ALASKA L. REV. 131, 134 (2014).
171. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 168, at 62–63.
172. See id. at 60–61 (discussing the effects of Rule 82 in the context of
personal injury and insurance defense litigation).
173. See id. (quoting an insurance personal injury defense attorney who said
that “[w]hen we . . . try to collect our Rule 82 award, we’re seen as ogres”).
174. Rennie, supra note 170, at 16.
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standard. This note analyzes three major arguments for the adoption of
a new summary judgment standard: (1) the efficient administration of
justice; (2) preventing confusion; and (3) promoting consistency. This
Note then addresses three arguments against changing the summary
judgment standard: (1) overstatement of the efficiency justification; (2)
the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury; and (3) stare decisis. This
Note concludes with a recommendation: the Alaska supreme court
should adopt the “reasonable jury” summary judgment standard in
accordance with the federal Celotex trilogy doctrine because the
arguments in favor of a modernized standard, coupled with Alaska’s
distinctive procedural devices, strongly outweigh the arguments to the
contrary.
A.

Arguments for Adopting the Federal Standard in Alaska
1.

Improving Efficiency

A modernized summary judgment standard would allow for a
more efficient administration of justice in Alaska state courts. The
standard this Note advocates is essentially the same as the “reasonable
jury” standard currently employed by federal courts. The purpose of the
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure is to “secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”175 A
modernized summary judgment rule—one that incorporates the
evidentiary burdens of the parties at trial and affords trial judges
sufficient discretion to determine motions based on the facts
presented—would be more faithful to the purpose of the Alaska Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The reasonable jury standard in Alaska has its strongest effect on
parties with the least viable claims. Yet, even these parties may fare
objectively better under the reasonable jury standard. For example, a
plaintiff with an exceptionally weak claim under Alaska’s current “not
too incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard will likely
have the opportunity to go to trial if they refuse to settle.176 Although
this hypothetical plaintiff can show more than a scintilla of evidence,
they will likely not be able to win at trial. After their day in court,
plaintiff may end up paying a portion of defendant’s attorney’s fees.177

175. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1.
176. See supra Part III discussing Alaska’s notice pleading requirements.
177. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. In this hypothetical, it is not hard to imagine that a
trial judge might be more likely to award defendant’s attorney’s fees after being
forced to deny summary judgment and preside over a largely meritless trial.
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The meritless plaintiff would have been in a better economic position
losing at summary judgment.
For the same economic reasons, defendants and the court would
prefer this outcome as well. Alaskan defendants stand to benefit
significantly from a modern summary judgment standard. Summary
judgment gives defendants at least one meaningful chance resolve weak
claims favorably, limit litigation expenses, and prevent the danger of
exposure to a runaway jury. Courts would benefit as well. The mere
threat of a stronger summary judgment standard would force contested
issues to the forefront of a dispute in the pre-trial phase and allow courts
to clear the docket of meritless cases more effectively. Nuisance value
lawsuits are an economic drag on defendants, plaintiffs, and the court
system. The reasonable jury standard would help to eliminate some of
this deadweight loss in Alaska courts.
The reasonable jury standard in Alaska would also promote the
efficient administration of justice by encouraging settlement. Alaska’s
procedural system affords defendants minimal opportunities to dispose
of claims before trial, especially when compared to the federal system.
Mindful plaintiffs, even those with relatively weak claims, will
recognize that defendants have no reasonable expectation of obtaining
dismissal at the pre-trial stage. Accordingly, plaintiffs have little
incentive to engage in settlement discussions before trial. Under the
current system, plaintiffs and defendants occupy diametrically opposed
positions with respect to settlement.
An effective summary judgment procedure forces parties to
evaluate the strength of their claims and defenses.178 In the case of a
weak claim where the court is more likely to grant summary judgment,
meaningful summary judgment would incentivize the nonmovant to
settle before the close of discovery. In the case of a contested claim, the
parties would have to make a more concerted effort at the summary
judgment stage by putting forth all available evidence to support their
claims. This would allow the court to filter out the non-contested issues
and enable the parties to better understand the opponent’s claims and
evidence. Even when denied, a motion for summary judgment under
the reasonable jury standard may have the effect of bringing the parties
closer to settlement.179 Forcing the parties to confront the realities of the

178. See Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV.
1165, 1167 (2010) (“This summary judgment burden of production insures that
only those cases with legitimate disputed issues of fact merit a trial and thereby
conserves expensive and scarce trial and jury resources.”).
179. See id. at 1167 (arguing that a denial of a summary judgment motion
enhances the value of settlement for the nonmovant).
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evidence and “balance the realistic probabilities of success against the
costs associated with further litigation” is more likely when the threat of
summary judgment is viewed by both parties as legitimate.180
Finally, granting trial court judges more discretion at the summary
judgment stage would allow for great efficiency in the administration of
justice. Alaska Rule 56 already grants judges a number of discretionary
powers. Judges may “refuse the application for judgment” or “order a
continuance” for further discovery or may “make such other order as is
just.”181 Under the current “not too incredible to be believed” standard, a
trial judge may deny summary judgment in the rare case where the
nonmovant presents no evidence at all, but would be unable to grant
summary judgment in a case where it is evident that the nonmovant
cannot meet its burden at trial. Increased flexibility in granting summary
judgments would be consistent with the trial judge’s other discretionary
powers.
2.

Preventing Confusion

The reasonable jury standard would also prevent considerable
confusion in Alaska courts. For one, legal practitioners must recognize
the difference between the state and federal summary judgment
standards as well as the difference between the state’s summary
judgment standard and its directed verdict standard. Additionally, the
Alaska supreme court has been less than clear in rejecting the federal
summary judgment standard. The supreme court’s recent discussion in
Christensen admits that the court has often conflated “reasonable
person” with “reasonable juror” and “reasonable jury.”182 The supreme
court has also cited to Celotex,183 Anderson,184 and Matsushita185

180. Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 23 at 75 n.11.
181. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f).
182. Supra, Part II.
183. The Alaska supreme court has erroneously cited to Celotex twice.
Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007); Cooper v. State, Dep’t of
Corr., No. S-14497, 2012 WL 4039813, at *2 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Greywolf, 151
P.3d at 1241).
184. The Alaska supreme court has erroneously cited to Anderson three times.
Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, (2000)); Enders v. Parker, 125
P.3d 1027, 1031–32 (Alaska 2005); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 71 (Alaska
2007) (Carpeneti, J., concurring).
185. The Alaska supreme court has cited Matsushita six times, though on each
occasion the case was cited for propositions other than the summary judgment
holding. Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432, 450 (Alaska
2002); Meyer v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel.
N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365, 369 (Alaska 1999) (Eastbaugh, J., concurring); Alakayak v.
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repeatedly—further confusing the issue of whether the state actually
rejects the federal reasonable jury standard. Lastly, the supreme court
has erroneously conflated the state’s “not too incredible to be believed”
summary judgment standard with its “reasonable jury” directed verdict
standard.186 So long as these two standards are in conflict, confusion will
persist within the Alaska Bar.
3.

Promoting Consistency

Applying the reasonable jury standard at the state level would also
promote consistency and produce more equitable and just results.
Though the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure were originally based on
the federal rules, the Supreme Court has adopted a modernized
interpretation of the federal rules, which Alaska courts largely declined
to follow. The federal modernization favors “increasingly early case
disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of
abusive and meritless lawsuits.”187 Any eligible defendant sued in
Alaska state court would be wise to file a notice of removal to take the
suit to federal court, where summary judgment is more attainable.
Accordingly, shrewd plaintiffs may be more likely to attempt to prevent
diversity of citizenship and thereby remain in state court. Either way,
the difference between state and federal procedural rules will be
outcome determinative for a significant number of parties, regardless of
the merits of the cases.
The reasonable jury standard may also promote consistency in
application across Alaska state courts as well. The current “not too
incredible to be believed” standard operates inconsistently to the extent
that trial courts and the Alaska supreme court disagree about the facts of
a case.188 Ultimately, the Alaska standard for summary judgment is

All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., No. 3AN-95-04676CI, 1999 WL 1027062 at *3–4
(Alaska Super Ct. July 2, 1999), rev’d sub nom. Alakayak v. British Columbia
Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2002); Buster v. Gale, 866 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska
1994); Colt Indus. Operating Corp., Quincy Compressor Div. v. Frank W.
Murphy Mfr., Inc., 822 P.2d 925, 933 (Alaska 1991), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Tort Reform Act of 1986, Ch. 139, § 1 SLA 1986, as recognized by Alaska
Gen. Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d 98, 105 (Alaska 2000); Norris v. Gatts, 738
P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1987).
186. Supra, Part III.
187. Miller, supra note 148, at 10.
188. E.g., Meyer v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.
ex rel. N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1999) (finding that Meyer had raised a
material fact issue of paternity through his sworn denial of sexual intercourse
during the relevant time period, while the superior court had granted summary
judgment based on a paternity test that established that there was a 99.98%
probability of Meyer’s paternity, thereby creating no issue of material fact).
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whatever the supreme court says it is—even in the case of the lying
affiant and a DNA test. The reasonable jury standard would promote
greater consistency and ease of administration by rendering the
interpretive distinctions between what reasonable minds would find
incredible and “not too incredible” irrelevant. Instead, under the
reasonable jury standard, the dispute must rise to the level of the
nonmovant’s substantive evidentiary burden.
B.

Arguments Against Adopting the Federal Standard in Alaska

Many scholars have discussed drawbacks and problems with the
modern federal summary judgment standard.189 None of these articles
address the particularities of Alaska law. Instead, the scholarship has
generally focused on the transformation of summary judgment within
the broader federal movement favoring early disposal and dismissal of
claims.190 Because Alaska has largely resisted the federal shift towards
early claims disposal, much of the summary judgment scholarship is of
limited utility as applied to Alaska’s procedural framework.
Nevertheless, there are at least three tenable arguments against
changing the Alaska summary judgment standard: (1) the efficiency
justification is overstated; (2) the Seventh Amendment right of trial by
jury; and (3) stare decisis.
1.

Efficiency

One argument against the modern reasonable jury standard is that
proponents overstate its efficiency. Opponents argue that the reasonable
jury standard incentivizes defendants to impose lengthy discovery
periods and an expensive motion practice upon all parties.191
Defendants, encouraged by the perceived gains at the summary

189. E.g., Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 74–75 (discussing the
unintended consequences of a liberalized summary judgment standard); Suja A.
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (2007)
(asserting that summary judgment unconstitutionally conflicts with the jury’s
role as the finder of fact); Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1897, 1898 (1998) (analyzing the transformation and increased use of
summary judgment in the D.C. Circuit); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982
(2003) (arguing for further guidance to prevent trial courts from encroaching on
the fundamental rights of litigants); John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment costs the
court system more than it saves).
190. E.g., Miller, supra note 148, at 10.
191. Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 551 (2007).
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judgment stage, would rattle off shotgun-style, boilerplate summary
judgment motions in every case.192 A logjam of summary judgment
motions would cripple court dockets and outweigh any gains from the
higher number of dismissals.193 Worst of all, these marginal or negligible
efficiencies come at the expense of an ever-eroding right to trial by
jury.194
There are two potential responses to the opponents’ argument that
the reasonable jury standard’s efficiency is overstated. First, judges
could summarily review a motion for summary judgment immediately
upon filing. In so doing, the judge would quickly determine whether the
motion was frivolous, whether an opposition was necessary, and
whether continued discovery was needed.195 This intermediate step
would allow judges to sift out meritless, boilerplate motions, even
before the nonmovant’s filing of an opposition.
Second, Alaska is uniquely situated to address any abuses of a
modernized summary judgment standard because of the state’s “English
Rule” for fee shifting.196 To the extent that reasonable jury summary
judgment would incentivize defendants to employ dilatory tactics,
expansive discovery, or expensive motion practices in the hopes of
escaping at summary judgment, such tactics would become a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, the defendant may have a better chance
at escaping a lawsuit using summary judgment. On the other hand,
extensively litigated issues would carry higher attorney’s fees under
Rule 82 for those defendants who lose at trial.197 Prior to
implementation, the efficiencies and inefficiencies of the reasonable jury
standard in Alaska are largely speculative. However, there is good
reason to think that some inefficiencies of the federal reasonable jury
standard may not translate in Alaska’s fairly unique procedural
landscape.
2.

Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury

Some commentators have argued that summary judgment is
unconstitutional.198 Generally, this argument holds that no procedural
mechanism available in 1791 restricted a plaintiff’s right to jury trial to

192. Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 478.
193. Id.
194. Miller, supra note 189, at 1134.
195. Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 479.
196. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (setting forth the schedule and procedure for
attorney’s fees awards in Alaska state courts).
197. See id.
198. Thomas, supra note 189, at 139–40; Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 547–50.

ARTICLE 5 - CAMPION (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ALASKA

5/18/2015 2:11 PM

209

the same extent as modern summary judgment,199 and that summary
judgment gave judges this power.200 Thus, because current federal
summary judgment practice affords judges a power that did not exist at
common law in 1791, federal summary judgment violates the
constitutional principle that “[i]n suits at common law, . . . the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved.”201
Substantial case law and commentary exists rejecting the view that
summary judgment is unconstitutional.202 While the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury, it does not preserve the
right to trial by jury for meritless or frivolous claims.203 More
importantly for the purposes of Alaska’s summary judgment standard,
under current U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, the Seventh Amendment is
one of the few Bill of Rights protections not incorporated upon the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.204 Thus, there is a strong argument
that the Seventh Amendment’s protection of a right to trial by jury
applies to the federal government and does not apply to the states.205
Instead, the constitutional protection argument against summary
judgment must rely on protection from the Alaska constitution. The
Alaska constitution provides: “In civil cases . . . the right of trial by a jury
of twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common
law.”206 The Alaska supreme court has repeatedly rejected claims that
summary judgment violates Article I § 16 of the constitution.207 At
common law in Alaska, courts had authority to remove factual issues
from consideration by the jury when the court determined “there was
insufficient evidence to raise a question of fact to be presented to the
jury.”208 A grant of summary judgment only violates the Alaska
constitution when improperly granted—that is, when granted if a
genuine issue of material fact actually exists.209 Accordingly, if the

199. Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 550.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
202. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 350–51 (1979); Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902); Brunet, supra note 178, at
1186.
203. Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320–21. “The purpose of the rule is to preserve the
court from frivolous defenses, and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as
means to delay the recovery of just demands.” Id.
204. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010).
205. Id.
206. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 16.
207. Capolicchio v. Levy, 194 P.3d 373, 380–81 (Alaska 2008); Falke v. Council
of the City of Fairbanks, 960 P.2d 589, 590 (Alaska 1998); Christensen v. NCH
Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 477 (Alaska 1998).
208. Christensen, 956 P.2d at 477 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
209. Id.
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Alaska supreme court were to adopt a new interpretation of “genuine
issue” that incorporated the nonmovant’s substantive evidentiary
burden, the same logic applies to the constitutionality of summary
judgment. If no genuine issue of fact exists and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is proper and
does not violate Art. I § 16 of the Alaska constitution.
The Alaska supreme court’s most recent statement on summary
judgment indicates the court may be unlikely to adopt a reformed
summary judgment standard any time soon.210 However, the supreme
court’s reason for declining to adopt a new standard does not appear to
be based on constitutional concerns.211 Instead, the court has maintained
its “lenient standard for withstanding summary judgment” to preserve
the right of litigants to have factual questions determined by the jury.212
3.

Stare Decisis

Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis stands in the way of a reformed
summary judgment standard in Alaska. Stare decisis is the principle to
let that which has been decided stand. The judiciary’s duty—to say what
the law is—would be meaningless if the court stated the law differently
at any given opportunity. While Alaska has adhered to the same method
of summary judgment analysis since its earliest days,213 the notion that
the summary judgment is “well-settled” is a dubious proposition.214
A party raising a claim controlled by existing precedent must show
compelling reasons for reconsidering the prior ruling.215 This burden
includes two elements. First, the party must show that the prior decision
was erroneous when decided or that intervening changes have rendered
the decision currently unsound.216 A party seeking to challenge the
summary judgment standard in Alaska would likely have a difficult
time arguing that intervening changes in Alaska have rendered
210. See Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 521 (Alaska
2014) (“We see no reason to deviate from our long-established summary
judgment standard today.”).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 520–21.
213. See Gilbertson v. Fairbanks, 368 P.2d 214, 214–17 (Alaska 1962) (showing
that shortly after gaining statehood, Alaska used the same summary judgment
standard).
214. See Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520 (attempting to clarify that the court’s
“inartful use of the term ‘reasonable jurors’ was not meant to suggest use of the
federal summary judgment standard”).
215. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 943 (Alaska
2004).
216. Id. (quoting State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 65
P.3d 851, 859 (Alaska 2003)).
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Christensen erroneous. Much has changed since the U.S. Supreme Court
decided the Celotex trilogy in 1986, but little has changed since the
Alaska supreme court decided Christensen in October 2014. Importantly,
the parties in Christensen did not brief the issue of Alaska’s summary
judgment standard.217 The appellee, seeking to affirm the lower court’s
grant of summary judgment, simply (and wrongly) asserted that Alaska
employed the reasonable jury standard.218 To satisfy the first element of
the doctrine of stare decisis, the party challenging the current “not too
incredible to be believed” standard would likely argue that the line of
cases spanning from Moffat to Christensen have improperly evaluated the
merits of the reasonable jury standard and arrived at an erroneous
conclusion as a result.
To satisfy the second element of the doctrine of stare decisis, a
party must show “that more good than harm would result from a
departure from precedent.”219 This analysis mirrors the costs and
benefits discussed in this Note, and the court considered some of these
arguments in Christensen.220 The harms of the reasonable jury summary
judgment standard include: (1) restricting access to courts and trial; (2)
uncertainty in applying a new standard in light of prior case law; and (3)
risks of defendants imposing expensive discovery and motion practice
on plaintiffs. However, these potential harms are outweighed by the
benefits of the reasonable jury standard, including: (1) efficiency in the
court system; (2) resolved confusion between the differing standards; (3)
consistency in application; and (4) fairness to defendants. Ultimately, the
reasonable jury summary judgment standard, applied in Alaska courts,
is more faithful to the goal of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: “to
secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action.”221 A
modern summary judgment standard in Alaska would more effectively
realize this admirable purpose.

CONCLUSION
Alaska should adopt the federal reasonable jury summary
judgment standard. The benefits of a modernized method of summary

217. Brief for Appellant at 24–25, Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc.,
335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No. S-14963); Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Christensen,
335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No. S-14963).
218. Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Christensen, 335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No.
S-14963).
219. Thomas, 102 P.3d at 943.
220. See Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520–21 (arguing that the more lenient
standard preserves the jury’s role as the finder of fact).
221. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1.
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judgment analysis are vast: judicial economy, consistency, fairness to
defendants, and greater incentives for settlement. While the role of the
jury as the finder of fact, stare decisis, and a long line of case law may
stand in the way of a new summary judgment standard, the potential
benefits of the modern federal standard outweigh these barriers.
Additionally, certain aspect of Alaska’s procedural rules—specifically,
notice pleading, the directed verdict standard, and “English Rule” fee
shifting—would result in a more equitable application of the reasonable
jury standard in Alaska as compared to the federal courts.
Alaska’s current summary judgment practices fail to fulfill the
purpose of the motion—”to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action.”222 Summary judgment should not be
denigrated as a trap for unsuspecting plaintiffs. “Its purpose is not to cut
litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have evidence
which they will offer on a trial, it is to carefully test out, in advance of
trial by inquiring and determining whether such evidence exists.”223 The
procedure’s goal mirrors that of the court system generally: to arrive at
the truth. Alaska’s “not too incredible to be believed” summary
judgment standard is less than adequate in fulfilling that role. The
Alaska supreme court should reconsider Christensen and adopt the
reasonable jury summary judgment standard.

222. Id.
223. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940).

